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Abstract
I use agent-based computational models of inferential language transmission to investigate the rela-
tionship between language change and the indeterminacy of meaning. I describe a model of com-
munication and learning based on the inference of meaning through disambiguation across multiple
contexts, which is then embedded within an iterated learning model. The dynamic flexibility and un-
certainty inherent in the model leads directly to variation between agents, in both their conceptual and
lexical structures. Over generations of repeated meaning inference, this variation leads to significant
language change. Despite such change, however, the language maintains its utility as a communicative
tool within each individual generation.
1 Introduction
All living human languages are constantly changing.
Tiny, often barely perceptible, changes in the con-
texts in which particular words are used, or the way
in which they are pronounced, accumulate over gen-
erations of use to such an extent that the language
itself becomes unrecognisable in only a few genera-
tions. The driving force behind historical linguistic
change is widely recognised to be linguistic variation
(Trask, 1996). In this paper, I explore the relation-
ship between the incessancy of language change and
the indeterminacy of meaning, using an agent-based
computational model of iterated inferential communi-
cation. Inferential communication focuses on the fact
that information is not transferred directly between
communicants, but rather indirectly: the hearer infers
the meaning of a signal from pragmatic insights and
the context in which the signal is heard. The uncer-
tainty inherent in this process means that individuals
do not necessarily infer the same meanings, leading to
differences in their internal linguistic representations.
Over generations of inferential communication, small
variations may result in significant levels of language
change.
Inferential models of language have already been
used successfully to model learning conceptual struc-
tures and language in tandem (Smith, 2003b) and
the effects of psychologically plausible constraints on
lexical acquisition (Smith, 2005), but have not yet
been used in the detailed study of process of language
change. In the experiments presented here, I build
on the basic inferential model, embedding it within
a successful model of repeated cultural transmission
with generational turnover (Smith et al., 2003), in or-
der to explore the nature and extent of language varia-
tion and change across many generations of language
users.
The remainder of this paper is divided into five
parts. In section 2, I explore the twin theoretical foun-
dations on which the model used to perform the ex-
periments is based, namely cultural transmission and
the inference of meaning. In section 3, I describe the
model in detail, including how agents create mean-
ings, communicate with each other, and infer mean-
ing from multiple contexts. In section 4, I discuss the
different kinds of variation which are present in the
model, and how these can be measured. In section 5, I
present the results of the experiments themselves, and
demonstrate that conceptual and lexical variations re-
sult in remarkably rapid and significant change to the
language itself. At the same time, the language’s util-
ity as a successful shared communication system is
reconfirmed within each generation. Finally, in sec-
tion 6, I provide a summary of the paper’s main con-
clusions.
2 Foundations
2.1 Cultural Transmission
Although we are all genetically endowed with the
cognitive capacity to learn and use language, the par-
ticular languages we actually learn are not stored in
our genes, but are instead those which we hear spo-
ken by people in the communities in which we live.
Languages are therefore passed on culturally. Re-
cent research into language evolution has focused on
this cultural nature of transmission, building models
which represent the external and internal manifesta-
tions of language as distinct phases in the language’s
life cycle: individuals produce their external linguis-
tic behaviour based on their internal linguistic repre-
sentations, and in turn induce their own internal lin-
guistic representations, or grammars, in response to
the linguistic behaviour, or primary linguistic data,
which they encounter. Such models of linguistic
evolution are known as expression/induction (E/I)
models (Hurford, 2002) or iterated learning models
(Smith et al., 2003). The cultural nature of these mod-
els is captured in the fact that the linguistic input used
by one individual to construct its grammar is itself
the linguistic output of other individuals. Differences
which occur between the internal grammars of indi-
vidual members of the population occur as a result of
the dynamic cultural evolution of the language itself.
Iterated learning models have been used success-
fully to demonstrate the cultural emergence of a
number of structural characteristics of language, no-
tably compositionality (Brighton, 2002) and recur-
sion (Kirby, 2002). These properties arise through re-
peated cultural transmission when agents must learn a
language made up of signal-meaning mappings from
a restricted set of data, through a transmission bottle-
neck. Under such conditions, holistic, idiosyncratic
rules of grammar can only be successfully transmit-
ted if the specific signal-meaning pair is encountered.
Compositional rules, on the other hand, are preferen-
tially produced due to their generalisability, and thus
are much more likely to pass through the bottleneck
into the next generation (Smith et al., 2003).
2.2 Meaning Inference
It is important to note, however, that many such
models of cultural evolution are characterised by the
explicit coupling of pairs of signals and predefined
meanings. This coupling necessarily leads to the de-
velopment of syntactic structure which is identical to
the predefined semantic structure, and which under-
mines, to a significant extent, the claims for emer-
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Figure 1: A model of communication which avoids
the signal redundancy paradox. The model has three
levels of representation: an external environment (A);
an internal semantic representation (B); and a public
set of signals (C). The mappings between A and B
and between B and C, represented by the arrows, fall
into the internal, private domain, whose boundary is
shown by the dotted line.
gence. In these models, a linguistic utterance consists
of the explicit conjunction of a signal and a meaning,
and communication involves the direct transfer of this
utterance between agents. In communication, then,
both the signal and the meaning are simultaneously
transferred. As I have shown previously, however, if
the meanings are directly transferred, then there is no
role for the signals to play, leading to the paradox of
signal redundancy (Smith, 2003b, 2005): what is the
motivation for language users to spend time and en-
ergy in learning a symbolic system of signals which
provides them no information that they do not already
have from the directly transferred meanings?
The inferential model presented here is motivated
to a large extent by avoiding the signal redundancy
paradox. This is easily done by recognising that
meanings are not directly transferable. Instead, a
meaning is encoded into a signal by the speaker, and
decoded back by the hearer. Of course, decoupling
meanings and signals means that there is now no easy
way for agents to associate them with each other, and
so we must assume that meanings are inferred from
some external source. The mere existence of an ex-
ternal world is not sufficient to avoid the signal re-
dundancy paradox, however; we must also insist on
a strong demarcation in the model between the exter-
nal world and the agents’ internal representations, as
shown in figure 1. The external, or public, domain
contains objects and situations which can be poten-
tially accessed and manipulated by all agents, while
the internal, or private, domains are accessible only
by a particular agent, and contain representations and
mappings created and developed by the agent itself.
Signals and their referents are linked only indi-
rectly, mediated via separate associative mappings
between themselves and each agent’s internal mean-
ing representations. The associative mappings them-
selves, however, are created individually by each
agent through analysis of the co-occurrence of signals
and referents over multiple situations, as described in
section 3.2 below.
3 The Inferential Model
The E/I models of cultural transmission described in
this article, therefore, contain neither a predefined,
structured meaning system, nor an explicit link be-
tween signals and meanings. Instead, I describe ex-
periments with simulated agents who initially have
neither conceptual nor lexical structures, but have the
ability to create conceptual representations and to in-
fer meaning from their experiences. The model con-
tains an external world with a number of objects,
which can be objectively described in terms of the
values of their abstract features, real numbers gen-
erated within the range [0:1]. Agents are provided
with dedicated sensory channels, which they can use
to sense whether a particular feature value falls within
two bounds, and use these to create meanings which
allow them to distinguish objects from each other.
Agents can also create words to express these mean-
ings and to communicate about the objects. This
model is based on that described initially by Steels
(1996), in which two agents (a speaker and a hearer)
play a series of language games, but is extended in a
number of ways. In the following sections, I describe
how agents create meanings in response to their inter-
actions with the external world, how they create and
use signals to communicate to each other about situ-
ations in the world, and how they infer the meanings
of signals they receive. Finally, I explain how the in-
ferential model is placed within an iterated learning
paradigm, to allow experiments exploring the nature
and extent of language change across generations.
3.1 Meaning Creation
Meaning creation occurs as agents explore their en-
vironment and try to discriminate objects from each
other. In such an exploratory episode, an agent
investigates a random subset of objects, called the
context, with the aim of distinguishing one particu-
lar, randomly-chosen target object within the context
from all the other objects therein. The agent searches
its sensory channels for a distinctive category, an in-
ternal semantic representation which accurately de-
scribes the target, but does not accurately describe the
other objects in the context. If no such category ex-
ists, and so the episode fails, the agent expands its
semantic capacity, by splitting the sensitivity range
of an existing category into two halves, thereby cre-
ating two new categories. Repeated meaning creation
in this way results in the development of hierarchi-
cal, tree-like conceptual structures where the nodes
on the tree represent semantic categories. Nodes
nearer the tree root represent more general meanings,
with wider sensitivity ranges which cover a greater
proportion of the semantic space, while those nearer
the leaves represent more specific meanings. Impor-
tantly, the simulations contain no pre-specification of
which categories should be created, and meaning cre-
ation is carried out by each agent individually accord-
ing to its own experiences. This means that individ-
ual agents create different, but typically equally valid,
conceptual representations of their world.
3.2 Inferential Communication
Communication follows from a successful discrimi-
nation episode. Having found a distinctive category,
the speaker chooses a suitable signal from its lexicon
to represent it; if none is appropriate, then the speaker
creates a new signal as a random string of letters. The
signal is then transmitted to the hearer, who also ob-
serves the original context from which the speaker de-
rived its distinctive category. Importantly, however,
neither the distinctive category nor the target object
to which it refers are ever identified to the hearer.
Hurford (1989) developed dynamic communica-
tion matrices of transmission and reception behaviour
to model the evolution of communication strate-
gies, and showed that bidirectional, Saussurean map-
pings between signals and meanings are essential in
the development of viable communication systems.
Oliphant and Batali (1997) extended this model to
show that the best way to ensure continuing increases
in communicative accuracy is for speakers to always
choose signals based on how they are interpreted by
the rest of the population. Their algorithm, however,
requires agents to be able to have direct access to
the internal representations of other agents. In or-
der to avoid this mind-reading, I have used a modi-
fied version of the algorithm, introspective obverter
(Smith, 2003b), in which the speaker chooses the sig-
nal which it would be most likely to interpret cor-
rectly, given the current context. Because the speaker
cannot access the interpretative behaviour of the other
agents, signal choice is based on the speaker’s own
interpretative behaviour.
Once provided with a signal, but without any in-
formation about the meaning or the object to which it
refers, the hearer must infer the meaning from the in-
formation in the context, and from its previous expe-
rience of the signal in other contexts. Inference takes
place through cross-situational statistical learning
(Smith and Vogt, 2004). In every situation in which
a word is encountered, the hearer creates a list of se-
mantic hypotheses, or every possible meaning which
could serve as a distinctive category for any single
object in the current context. Each of these mean-
ings is then associated with the signal in the hearer’s
internal lexicon. The lexicon contains a count of the
co-occurrence of each signal-meaning pair 
	 ,
which is used to calculate the conditional probability
that, given  , 	 is associated with  . The hearer sim-
ply chooses the meaning with the highest conditional
probability for the signal it receives and assumes that
this was the intended meaning.
If the hearer’s chosen meaning identifies the same
object as the speaker’s initial target object, then the
communicative episode is deemed successful. Com-
municative success is therefore based on referent
identity: there is no requirement for the agents to use
(or even to have) the same internal meaning, but they
must identify the same external referent. Further-
more, neither agent receives any feedback about the
communicative success of the episode, so the only in-
formation available for use in the inferential process
is the co-occurrence of signals and referents across
multiple contexts. This method of cross-situational
inferential learning is similar to the method proposed
by Siskind (1996), but differs from it most fundamen-
tally in that the set of possible meanings over which
inferences are made in the model presented here is
neither fixed nor predefined, but is instead dynamic,
and in principle infinite.
Previous experiments using cross-situational sta-
tistical learning show that the method is powerful
enough for agents to learn large lexicons, and that
agents with different conceptual structures can com-
municate successfully. The time taken to learn a
whole lexicon is primarily dependent on the size of
the context in which each item is presented (Smith,
2003a; Smith and Vogt, 2004), while communica-
tive success is closely related to the level of inter-
agent meaning similarity (Smith, 2003b). However,
if agents are endowed with psychologically motivated
interpretational biases to aid inference, such as mu-
tual exclusivity (Markman, 1989), then even agents
with very dissimilar conceptual structures can com-
municate successfully (Smith, 2005).
3.3 Iterated Inference
In order to explore how languages change over gen-
erations, the inferential model is then extended ver-
tically into a traditional iterated learning model with
generational turnover (Smith et al., 2003). It is help-
ful in this regard to consider the speaker as an adult,
and the hearer as a child. Each generation con-
sists of a number of exploratory episodes, in which
both agents explore the world individually and cre-
ate meanings to represent what they find, followed by
a number of communicative episodes, in which the
adult communicates to the child. At the end of a gen-
eration, the adult is removed from the population, the
child becomes an adult, and a new child is introduced.
The language which was inferred in the previous gen-
eration by the child becomes the source of its own
linguistic output in the subsequent generation, when
it is an adult. This process of generational turnover is
then iterated a specified number of times.
4 Variation
It is well recognised that language change is driven
by various kinds of variation in language communi-
ties (Trask, 1996). In the inferential model I have
sketched above, there are two main sources of vari-
ation, which I will call conceptual and lexical. In the
following sections, I will describe the source and ef-
fects of both types of variation, examples of which
can be seen in figure 2. Taken from a representative
simulation, this shows an extract from the conceptual
and lexical structure of an adult and a child from the
same generation. Each agent actually has five sensory
channels on which conceptual structures are built, but
only one of these channels is shown in figure 2.
4.1 Conceptual Variation
The independent creation of conceptual structure
based on individual experience leads inevitably to
variation in agents’ conceptual representations, both
because an agent’s response to a certain situation is
not deterministic, and because the experiences them-
selves differ between agents. The relative similar-
ity of two agents’ conceptual representations can be
quantified by measuring the tree structures built on
each sensory channel, then averaging across each sen-
sory channel (Smith, 2003a). If  
 is the number
of nodes which two trees  and  have in common,
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Figure 2: Extract from the internal structures of two agents, showing variation in both conceptual and lexical
structures. The conceptual structures are shown by hierarchical tree structures, each node of which represents a
different meaning. Conceptual variation, where meanings have no corresponding equivalent in the other agent’s
conceptual structure, is marked with dotted lines and colour. Lexical structures are represented by the words
attached to the nodes, which signify the agent’s preferred word for the meaning; empty nodes have no preferred
word. Lexical variations, where the agents disagree on the meaning of a word, are circled.
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In figure 2 above, we consider only the nodes on
the trees themselves, without reference to the words
attached to them. Nodes which have no equivalent
in the other agent’s conceptual structure are marked
with dotted lines and colour. This shows clearly that,
although similar, the agents have developed different
tree structures: the child has created additional con-
ceptual structure in three different places.
4.2 Lexical Variation
The inherent uncertainty in the process of meaning
inference through cross-situational learning also pro-
duces variations in the lexical associations made by
the agents. Not only are the inferred meanings depen-
dent on the particular conceptual structure the hearer
has created, but the associations themselves depend
on the particular contexts in which the words are
heard. Lexical variation can be measured by con-
sidering whether two agents have the same preferred
word for any given meaning. An agent’s set of pre-
ferred words is calculated by sorting a copy of its en-
tire lexicon in descending order of conditional proba-
bility (see section 3.2), then mainpulating as follows:
1. find the topmost lexical entry, which is made up
of signal  and meaning 	 .
(a) store  as the preferred word for 	 ;
(b) delete all lexical entries containing  .
2. repeat step 1, until the lexicon is empty.
In figure 2, preferred words are represented by the
words attached to the appropriate nodes on the tree
structure; empty nodes have no preferred word. If
adult and child both have the same preferred word
for a meaning, then the child has successfully learnt
the word, and the lexical item has persisted through
the generation. Lexical items which do not persist
have undergone different kinds of semantic change;
these are shown as circled words in figure 2. For ex-
ample, the words wm and hhd have not been learnt
successfully, despite the relevant nodes in the adult’s
conceptual structure also existing in the child’s struc-
ture. In both of these cases, the words are associated
with nodes nearer the root of the child’s tree than the
adult’s; because nodes nearer the root of a tree cover
a larger area of semantic space, I consider this kind
of change as a generalisation. Other kinds of seman-
tic change, such as specialisation and analogy are not
discussed further here.
Lexical persistence across the whole of an agent’s
lexicon is very useful as a broad measure of linguis-
tic change, and can be measured both within and be-
tween generations: intra-generational lexical persis-
tence is the proportion of the adult’s lexicon learnt by
the child, while inter-generational lexical persistence
is the proportion of the original language developed
by the adult in the first generation of the simulation
which is still intact in the language of the child at the
end of the  th generation.
5 Experimental Results
The aim of these experiments was twofold. Firstly,
I wanted to verify whether results obtained in previ-
ous experiments with an inferential model in a single
generation, briefly summarised in section 3.2, would
remain valid in a multi-generational model. More im-
portantly, I wanted to measure how languages them-
selves change over a number of generations, to ex-
plore whether languages undergoing rapid language
change over successive populations of language users
could still be communicatively viable.
5.1 Communicative Success and Mean-
ing Similarity
I have previously shown in mono-generational in-
ferential models that levels of communicative suc-
cess are closely correlated with levels of mean-
ing similarity between agents (Smith, 2003b). Fig-
ure 3 shows results from a typical simulation run
over ten generations, each of which is made up of
20,000 episodes. Analyses of communicative success
and meaning similarity were calculated every 1000
episodes: communicative success measures the pro-
portion of successful communications over the previ-
ous 1000 episodes, while meaning similarity is mea-
sured as described in section 4.1.
We can clearly see that levels of meaning similar-
ity and communicative success are again very closely
correlated, as expected. In each generation, the com-
municative success rate rises rapidly at first, as the
child successfully learns the meanings of many words
through cross-situational inference. The rate then
climbs more slowly, as the child tries to deduce the
meanings of the remaining words. These represent
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Figure 3: Communicative success and meaning simi-
larity in an iterated inference model. Each generation
consists of 20000 episodes.
meanings which are seldom used by the adult as dis-
tinctive categories, and so consequently occur rela-
tively infrequently in communicative episodes, which
makes the process of disambiguation through expo-
sure in different contexts much slower.
Levels of communicative success and meaning
similarity at the end of each generation were also
measured, to see if any inter-generational trends were
present, but we can clearly see in figure 3 that the lev-
els of communicative success and meaning similar-
ity achieved at the end of each generation were very
similar, and in fact no significant inter-generational
changes are discernible. This latter results contradicts
recent work by Vogt (2003), however, who claims
a small increase in inter-generational communicative
success in simulations run through his Talking Heads
simulator, using a similar model of inferential learn-
ing, which he calls selfish games.
5.2 Lexical Persistence
Secondly, I explored changes in the languages them-
selves over generations of different lengths, mea-
suring lexical persistence to determine the nature
and extent of change. Figure 4 shows both inter-
generational and intra-generational lexical persis-
tence over simulations of ten generations.
A comparison of the two graphs in figure 4 shows
us how the length of a generation (the number of
episodes which it contains) affects both measures
of lexical persistence. Generations containing 5000
episodes (left) result in intra-generational lexical per-
sistence rates at the end of each generation of between
60 and 70%, but if the generation length is increased
to 20,000 episodes (right), then the lexical persistence
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Figure 4: Inter-generational and intra-generation lexical persistence. Each generation consists of 5000 episodes
(left) and 20,000 episodes (right).
rates are closer to 80%. Unsurprisingly, given more
exposure to the language, the child is able to learn
a higher proportion of it successfully. Note, how-
ever, that variation in the conceptual structures of the
agents provides an effective ceiling for the level of
intra-generational lexical persistence, as it is impos-
sible for the child to learn the meaning of a word if
the corresponding conceptual structure does not exist
in its repertoire.
Figure 4 also shows that there are no significant
differences between the levels of lexical persistence
obtained within different generations. It is clear, on
the other hand, that the rate of inter-generational lex-
ical persistence shows a considerable cumulative de-
cline after only a few generations. There are two sep-
arate pressures on the language which enforce its re-
lentless erosion over successive generations of cul-
tural transmission through inference, which can be
regarded as twin bottlenecks on the language’s trans-
mission.
1. Conceptual variation restricts the number of
words which can potentially persist into the next
generation: only words which refer to meanings
which are shared are available to be learnt.
2. Lexical variation, or imperfections in inferential
learning, further restricts the number of words
which actually persist into the next generation.
The pressures from these two bottlenecks naturally
result in a cumulative decline in inter-generational
lexical persistence. These pressures are compounded
in subsequent generations, so that even after only a
few generations are passed, very little of the origi-
nal language remains, and we find a language which
is changing very rapidly on an inter-generational
timescale. Importantly, however, we can see from fig-
ure 3 that this rapid language change does not affect
levels of communication within a single generation,
which remain very high.
5.3 Generally Stable
If we investigate in more detail the languages which
are used by the child at the end of each generation,
we find that there is a distinct pattern to the language
change which occurs. Words referring to more spe-
cific meanings tend to disappear first, and only more
general words tend to survive across multiple gener-
ations. There are two obvious reasons for this, both
artefacts of the design of the model. Firstly, the Steel-
sian method of hierarchical conceptual construction
forces some order on the meanings which are created:
there is no way, for instance, to create a meaning in
the depths of a tree without first creating the relevant
meanings further up the hierarchical structure. This
restriction necessarily means that the more general
meanings nearer the root of the tree, are more likely
to be shared by the agents, and therefore less likely
to be excluded from being learnt by the conceptual
variation bottleneck. Secondly, agents use a model of
communication which follows the maxim of quantity
in Grice (1975)’s philosophical model of conversa-
tion, by choosing as distinctive categories meanings
which provide sufficient information to identify the
target object, but are not unnecessarily specific. This
means in turn that more general meanings are more
likely to be both used by the adult and also inferred by
the child, and so are much more likely to pass through
the second bottleneck on learning.
6 Conclusions
Although the cultural nature of language transmis-
sion is becoming more widely recognised, its infer-
ential character is less widely acknowledged. Infer-
ential communication not only provides an explana-
tion for the existence of otherwise redundant signals,
but also allows the construction of realistic models
of dynamic language, in which uncertainty, variation
and imperfect learning play crucial roles.
In this article, I have briefly presented a model
of language as a culturally transmitted system of
communication, based on the creation and inference
of meaning from experience. Individual meaning
creation, and the uncertainty inherent in meaning
inference lead to different degrees of variation in
both conceptual and lexical structure. Conceptual
variation and imperfect learning create twin bottle-
necks on transmission, which result in rapid language
change across generations. Despite this rapid lan-
guage change, however, within each single genera-
tion the language itself remains sufficiently stable to
establish and maintain its utility as a successful com-
munication system.
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